We are now ready to proceed to the main part of the paper. Possibilistic information about the values that a variable ξ may assume in X is represented by its possibility distribution function π ξ , a sup-normal X −L-mapping [2] . When p is a clear (non-vague) property, with extension [P p ] = { x | x ∈ X and x is p } of X, this possibilistic information can be transformed into possibilistic information about the truth value χ [Pp] (ξ) of the proposition variable P p (ξ) = 'ξ is p'. This information can be represented by the possibility distribution function π χ [Pp] (ξ) of the variable χ [P p ] (ξ) in T . It is easily verified that the sup-normal T − Lmapping π χ [Pp] (ξ) is given by π χ [Pp] (ξ) = χ [Pp] (π ξ ). Therefore π χ [Pp ] (ξ) (ν) = sup χ [P p ] (x)=ν π ξ (x) is the (L, ≤)-possibility that the proposition variable is true (ν = true) or false (ν = false). π χ [Pp] (ξ) can be generally called a (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth value. When a proposition variable 'ξ is p' has the (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth value true, this means that it cannot be false, and is therefore necessarily true, taking into account the information about the values that ξ may assume in X. An analogous interpretation can be given to false. When the proposition variable 'ξ is p' has the (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth value unknown, this means that, taking into account the information about the values that ξ may assume, it is completely possible that the proposition variable is true, and equally possible that it is false. The truth value of this proposition variable is then completely unknown, because of insufficient information about the values that ξ may assume in X.
Definition 1 We call (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth value any sup-normal T − L-mapping. The set of the (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth values is denoted by T . We also introduce three (L,
Above, we have shown how possibilistic information about the values a variable ξ may assume in a universe X can be transformed into possibilistic information about the truth value of a proposition about this variable. Next, we observe that, in general, propositions can be combined to form new propositions, using logical operators. In this way, a proposition P can be transformed by the logical negation operator into a proposition NOT P . By extension, the proposition function P p can be transformed into a proposition function NOT P p by the pointwise application of the logical negation operator: (NOT P p )(x) = NOT(P p (x)) = 'x is not p', x ∈ X. In a completely similar way, the proposition variable P p (ξ) = 'ξ is p' is transformed by the logical negation operator into the proposition variable (NOT P p )(ξ), defined as 'ξ is not p'. Analogously, the proposition variables 'ξ is p' and 'ξ is q' can be transformed into the proposition variable (P p AND P q )(ξ), defined as 'ξ is p and ξ is q', using the logical conjunction operator AND, and into the proposition variable (P p OR P q )(ξ), defined as 'ξ is p or ξ is q', using the logical disjunction operator OR.
As is well known, classical propositional logic is truth-functional , and the behaviour of logical operators can be characterised by classical-logical functions. The conjunction ∧, the disjunction ∨ and the implication ⇒, defined on T , are classical-logical functions of arity 2, characterising the truth-functional behaviour of respectively the logical conjunction, disjunction and implication operator in classical propositional logic. The negation ¬, defined on T , is a classical-logical function of arity 1, characterising the truth-functional behaviour of the logical negation operator in that logic. More explicitly, the behaviour of the logical negation operator is mirrored in the behaviour of ¬ in the following sense:
. In a completely analogous way, the behaviour of the logical disjunction operator is mirrored in the behaviour of ∨ in the following sense:
Generally, we can start with n clear predicates p 1 , . . . , p n with extensions [P p1 ], . . . , [P pn ], and with a n-ary logical operator LOP. This logical operator transforms the proposition variables P p1 (ξ), . . . , P pn (ξ) into the proposition variable LOP(P p1 , . . . , P pn )(ξ), defined as LOP('ξ is p 1 ', . . . , 'ξ is p n '), with extension [LOP(P p1 , . . . , P pn )]. The behaviour of LOP is mirrored by a T n − T -mapping φ, in the following sense, with obvious notations:
What we now want to do is to extend the classical, truth-functional approach: formally consider T as a set of (epistemological) truth values, and look at how these truth values can be combined into new ones. After that, we intend to show that at least for some of these combinations, there is a clear and definite link with combinations of propositions through logical operators. In this way, we intend to prove that, in some cases, possibilistic logic is also truth-functional.
Definition 3 Let n be a strictly positive natural number. A ( T ) n − T -mapping is called a (L, ≤)-possibilistic-logical function of arity n. The set of the (L, ≤)-possibilistic-logical functions of arbitrary arity is given the notation L.
We can associate a (L, ≤)-possibilistic-logical function with every classical-logical function, simply by looking at its (L, ≤)-possibilistic T -extension. Of course, this extension must be properly restricted, because we only work with sup-normal T − L-mappings as possibilistic truth values.
Definition 4 Let n be a strictly positive natural number and let φ be a classical-logical function of arity n.
We now give the rationale for the introduction of extension logics. We do so by addressing the following question: how, starting with possibilistic information about the values that a variable ξ may assume in X, can we derive the possibilistic truth value of the combined proposition variable LOP('ξ is p 1 ', . . . , 'ξ is p n ')?
It is easily verified that if the variables
in the case of possibilistic independence, there is truth-functionality for possibilistic logic.
In the rest of this section, we study the most important properties of some special (L, ≤)-possibilisticlogical functions of arity 1 and 2: ¬ T , ∧ T , ∨ T and ⇒ T . First of all, it will help us if we can find simple expressions for these operators.
Proposition 5
1.
Let us now give a brief survey of the most important properties of the above-mentioned possibilisticlogical functions. It should be noted that the equalities in these properties are equalities of (L, ≤)-possibilistic truth values, and therefore pointwise equalities of T − L-mappings. Also, t, t 1 , t 2 and t 3 denote arbitrary elements of T .
Proposition 6
1. 
(Boundary conditions)
Note that ∧ T and ∨ T are idempotent iff T is, i.e. iff T = [6] . Furthermore, ∧ T and ∨ T are mutually distributive iff T and sup are mutually distributive. This is again only possible if T = [6] . Thus, it appears that the choice T = is a rather special one. In this respect, note also that if we consider the lattice ( T , ≤), where ≤ is the partial order relation on T , introduced in the following section, then ∧ T is a t-norm and ∨ T is a t-conorm [6] on this structure. These operators are dual [6] w.r.t. the negation ¬ T on ( T , ≤). ∧ T is the meet and ∨ T the join of the lattice ( T , ≤) iff T = . We therefore devote the next section to the study of this special case.
An interesting special case
In this section, we intend to take a closer look at the notions introduced above, in the special case T = . This means that we assume that (L, ≤) is a complete Brouwerian lattice [1] .
Proposition 7 ( T , ∧ , ∨ ) is a bounded distributive lattice (as an algebra) with top true and bottom false. The partial order relation ≤ on T that corresponds with this structure satisfies:
Besides the binary operators meet ∧ and join ∨ of ( T , ≤), there also exists the unary operator ¬ . Its properties are studied in the next proposition, which also establishes the relationship between possibilistic -extension logics and a special class of multi-valued logics [11] . By a negation operator on a bounded poset, we mean a dual order-automorphism on that structure [6] . 
Proposition 8 1. ¬ is an involutive negation operator, but not a complement operator, on ( T , ≤).

( T , ∧ , ∨ , ¬ ) is a Morgan algebra [12], i.e. ( T , ∧ , ∨ ) is a bounded distributive lattice (as an algebra), with a unary operator ¬ satisfying (i) ¬ is involutive; and (ii)
∧
( T , ∧ , ∨ , ¬ ) is a Kleene algebra [12], i.e. ( T , ∧ , ∨ , ¬ ) is a Morgan algebra with fur-
The operators ¬ , ∧ and ∨ on T therefore satisfy the characteristic properties of the negation, conjunction and disjunction in the multi-valued strong Kleene logics with truth domain ( T , ≤) [11] . For the implication we have, taking into account proposition 6, that t 1 ⇒ t 2 = ( ¬ t 1 ) ∨ t 2 , t 1 , t 2 ∈ T , which implies that this implication is a typical instance of a Kleene-Dienes implication [11] .
At the same time, if (L, ≤) is a Boolean chain (of length 2), we recover Kleene's strong ternary logic. Let us briefly study the exact relationship between possibilistic -extension logics and Kleene's strong ternary logic. We consider a universe X and two clear properties p and q with extensions [P p ] = { x | x ∈ X and x is p } and [P q ] = { x | x ∈ X and x is q }. Also, we consider a variable ξ in X. Let us assume that we have the following information about the values that ξ may assume in X: ξ must be an element of A, with A ⊆ X. This information can be represented in the form of the normal ({0, 1}, ≤)-possibility measure Π A , with for arbitrary B ⊆ X:
is the possibility that ξ belongs to B. Indeed, if B ∩ A = ∅, then ξ cannot belong to B, since we already know that ξ ∈ A. Remark that the distribution of Π A , and therefore also the possibility distribution function of ξ, is the characteristic
Starting from this possibilistic information χ A , we now ask ourselves what can be deduced about the truth values of the proposition variables 'ξ is p', 'ξ is q' and a few of their combinations. In order to answer this question, we simply apply the theory developed above in the special case (L, ≤) = ({0, 1}, ≤). The only triangular norm on ({0, 1}, ≤) is the meet [6] , which immediately leads us to the special case discussed in this section. Note that in this particular case T = { false, unknown, true} and ( T , ≤) is a chain of length 3, with bottom false, top true and in between unknown. In this chain, ∧ is the meet, ∨ is the join, and ¬ is the unique and involutive negation operator. ( T , ∧ , ∨ , ¬ ) is a Kleene algebra and is as such isomorphic to the corresponding structure of the strong ternary logic introduced by Kleene [11] .
It is readily verified that the ({0, 1}, ≤)-possibilistic truth value t P p = χ [Pp] 
in other words, iff it is uncertain (i.e. not impossible and not necessary) whether ξ is p and whether ξ is q, and at the same time impossible that ξ is p and ξ is q. Indeed, in that case, we have that t Pp AND Pq = false, whereas t Pp ∧ t Pq = unknown ∧ unknown = unknown. A similar argument can be given for the disjunction. We conclude that there is not necessarily truth-functionality for the logical disjunction and conjunction operators of classical propositional logic, as far as the ({0, 1}, ≤)-possibilistic truth values are concerned. The possibilistic approach therefore only results in a strong ternary Kleene logic if a number of independence properties are satisfied. Indeed, it is shown in [4] that condition (1) is related to the conditions for the possibilistic (or logical) independence of the events [P p ] and [P q ]. In some cases these conditions are not satisfied, and the possibilistic approach is therefore not truth-functional , and therefore does not lead to a strong ternary Kleene logic. In these cases however, the strong ternary Kleene logic does provide us with a conservative approximation, since wherever it goes wrong, it results in the possibilistic truth value unknown, where the possibilistic approach yields the possibilistic truth values true or false.
Conclusion
Possibilistic logic can be described as a set of techniques that enable us to incorporate possibilistic uncertainty in a formal logical system. It turns out that under a number of independence assumptions, possibilistic logic leads to the special case of a possibilistic extension logic. A special subclass of these, the possibilistic-logical -extensions, are related with strong multi-valued Kleene logics. Thus, a possibilistic justification is given for the introduction and use of these Kleene systems.
